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Lessons from Taiwan's Miracle
and Crisis |
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Gustav
Ranis |
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I.Introduction |
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In honoring
John Fei's memory by creating this foundation, it is appropriate
that we recall what he cared about the most: the need
to continue to improve our understanding of thehistorical
process of economic development on this island and its
relation to the democratization process. He unfortunately
left us prior to the so-called East Asian crisis and while
the world was still admiring the so-called East Asian
miracle. But what I would like to focus on today, and
what I believe he would have emphasized if he were still
with us, is that Taiwan's record, while extraordinary
by any comparative standards, can be fully understood
and explained and was, therefore, not a "miracle"--moreover
that her performance since 1997 cannot be characterized
as beset by crisis. As we trace events over the past nearly
four decades since I first began to visit Taiwan in the
early 60s, we cannot help but be deeply impressed by the
consistently high levels, in the 7-8％ range, of growth
and the improving levels of participation and distributional
equity. The far-sighted creation of this foundation will
permit John Fei's work to be carried on, not only for
its own sake but as a lesson for other developing countries.
The basic question I want to pose is as follows: while
Taiwan was clearly subject to contagion or spill-over
effects in recent years, it clearly was not hurt as badly
as its neighbors, especially, for example, South Korea,
with which it has always been compared internationally
and locally. She did so without the benefit of the IMF,
and perhaps because of the absence of the IMF. The question
to be answered therefore: is there something in this particular
version of the East Asian miracle that protected Taiwan
from the worst effects of the East Asian financial crisis？Let
me be clear; I do not believe, looking backwards, that
policy mistakes weren't committed on Taiwan, as well as
elsewhere, for example in the financial sector. It is
part of the human condition from which we all suffer.
But my basic theme will be that Taiwan's historical path
made it something of an outlier, even among the so--called
"miracle countries," and while no one can ever be inoculated
against crisis--and we know there will be future ones
as well--her particular initial conditions and her particular
reinforcement by policy change over time spared Taiwan
from experiencing the more severe version of recent problems.
Since I will endeavor to"explain" why Taiwan has done
unusually well over the past half century of development,
and--while not without problems--continues to do so to
this day--this means that I will henceforth discard the
term "miracle" since I believe that this was not an act
of heaven, but explainable in terms of a combination of
exogenous conditions and acts of governance. Section II
will briefly review the favorable initial conditions which
were, I believe, instrumental in making Taiwan something
of an outlier even in the favored East Asian context.
Section III will focus on the policy framework which gave
Taiwan additional advantages over some of its neighbors
over the past four decades. Section IV will conclude.
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